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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. : Case No. 970100-CA 
VASSILIOS CHALKIDIS, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for distribution of a 
controlled substance (cocaine) within 1000 feet of a public park, 
a first degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction over the 
appeal pursuant to the pourover provision of Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2)(j)(1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Has defendant preserved his claim that the trial court's 
jury instruction defining ^public place" should have conformed to 
the definition of that term as articulated in a civil case 
construing the Landowner Liability Act? 
"With limited exceptions, the practice of this court has 
been to decline consideration of issues raised for the first time 
on appeal." Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. of Educ. 797 P. 2d 412, 
413 (Utah 1990). Moreover, if a party leads the trial court into 
committing an error, that party cannot take advantage of the 
error on appeal. State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993). 
2. Does the term "public park" as used in the penalty 
enhancement provision of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(5)(a)(v) 
include a neighborhood park located within a subdivision of 366 
homes? 
The proper interpretation of "public park" as used in a 
particular statute presents a question of law, reviewed on appeal 
for correctness. See, e.g.. State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 
(Utah 1993); State v. Shipler. 869 P.2d 968, 969 (Utah App. 
1994) . 
3. Was the evidence that Gazebo Park was a public park for 
purposes of the enhancement provision of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(5)(v) sufficient to support the jury's verdict? 
A criminal conviction will be reversed for insufficient 
evidence only when the evidence is "so inconclusive or so 
inherently improbable that "reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt' that the defendant committed the 
crime." State v. Goddard. 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994)(quoting 
State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), superseded on 
2 
other grounds. Stfrte v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The enhancement provision of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(5) 
increases the penalty by one degree for a felony that would 
otherwise have been less than a first degree felony if the 
criminal act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or 
secondary school or on the grounds of any of 
those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school 
or post-secondary institution or on the 
grounds of any of those schools or 
institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, 
park, stadium, or other structure or grounds 
which are, at the time of the act, being used 
for an activity sponsored by or through a 
school or institution under Subsections 
(5) (a) (i) and (ii) ; 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a pre-school or 
child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, 
or recreation center; 
(vi) in a church or synagogue; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, 
stadium, arena, theater, movie house, 
playhouse, or parking lot or structure 
adjacent thereto; 
(vii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, 
facility, or grounds included in Subsections 
(5)(a)(i) through (viii); or 
(x) with a person younger than 18 years of 
age, regardless of where the act occurs. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count of distribution of a 
controlled substance within 1000 feet of a public park, a first 
degree felony (R. 2-3). He was tried before a jury and convicted 
as charged (R. 164-66). The trial court sentenced him to five 
years to life in the Utah State Prison, to run concurrently with 
two other prison sentences; recommended credit for time served; 
and ordered that he could be released to the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service for deportation proceedings (R. 253). 
This timely appeal followed (R. 254). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant was arrested after he sold cocaine to a 
confidential informant at his home in Lake View Heights, a North 
Ogden subdivision of 366 homes (R. 4, 274, 283). Defendant's 
home was located just across the street from Gazebo Park, the 
largest of three neighborhood recreation areas within the housing 
development (R. 275, 287, 296). The Lake View Heights 
Homeowners' Association, in which membership was mandatory for 
all homeowners, owned Gazebo Park, which contained playground 
equipment, tennis courts, and picnic facilities (R. 287, 295, 
297). The park was freely accessed by the more than 1000 members 
of the public who lived in Lake View Heights (R. 284). The 
4 
subdivision was policed by the North Ogden city police department 
(R. 280). 
These are the only facts relevant to defendant's appeal, 
which focuses on whether Gazebo Park was a "public park" for 
purposes of statutorily enhancing the penalty for distribution of 
a controlled substance from a second degree felony to a first 
degree felony. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that the trial court incorrectly instructed 
the jury on the meaning of "public" as that term is used in the 
phrase "public park" in the drug enhancement statute. He 
believes that the trial court should have used the definition 
articulated in Perrine v, Kennecott Mining CcrPt, 9ii P.2d 1290 
(Utah 1996}, a civil case construing the Landowner Liability Act. 
Because defendant asserted a different position in the trial 
court -- that the jury ought not be given any instruction at all 
because the term was so commonly understood -- the argument he 
now asserts on appeal "smacks of invited error," and should not 
be considered. Pfrygong vT Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 520 (Utah), 
cert, denied. 513 U.S. 966 (1994). 
Second, in any event, the definition of "public place" 
articulated in jury instruction #28 correctly states the law. It 
5 
does not run afoul of the plain language of the statute and is 
strongly supported by both underlying legislative intent and 
public policy. Clearly, the law was intended to protect children 
from the influences and obvious dangers posed by persons who deal 
drugs in locations likely to be frequented by children. To 
insulate criminals who deal drugs in parks that belong to 
homeowners' associations but are nonetheless intended for use by 
neighboring children would contravene the fundamental purpose of 
the statute. 
Finally, the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict. 
For a jury to construe Gazebo Park as a public park was not 
inherently improbable. All the jury had to do was look at how 
the park actually functioned. Substantial numbers of people, all 
members of the public, frequented the park; children were 
attracted by the playground equipment to play there; no locked 
gates or fences kept people out; and the city police patrolled 
the park. 
For all of these reasons, defendant's conviction for 
distribution of a controlled substance within 1000 feet of a 
public park should be affirmed. 
6 
ARGUMENT 
POINT QNE 
DEFENDANT HAS WAIVED THE CLAIM THAT 
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION ON THE 
MEANING OF *PUBLIC PLACE" SHOULD 
HAVE CONFORMED TO THE PERRINE 
DEFINITION OF THAT TERM 
Defendant asserts on appeal that the trial court incorrectly 
instructed the jury on the meaning of "public," as that term is 
used in the phrase "public park" in the drug enhancement statute. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(5) (v). Because the court did not 
instruct the jury in conformity with the definition adopted in 
Perrine v. Kennecott Mining Corp.. 911 P.2d 1290 (Utah 1996), 
defendant believes he was prejudiced and that this Court should 
vacate the enhancement and reduce his conviction to a second 
degree felony (Br. of App. at 18-20). 
The law is well settled that a defendant must specifically 
state to the trial court the same grounds for objection to 
evidence that he presents on appeal. See, e.g.. State v. Davis. 
689 P.2d 5, 14 (Utah 1984). In the context of jury instructions, 
the general rule is that *[n]o party may assign as error any 
portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless he objects 
thereto before the jury is instructed, stating distinctly the 
7 
matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection."1 
Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c). 
In this instance, defendant made a clear and specific 
objection in the trial court to jury instruction #28, which 
defined "public place." He stated: 
Your Honor, at this time I would object to 
the inclusion of the definitions of "public" 
in the jury instructions based on the fact 
that the statute itself, which includes the 
Controlled Substance Act, does not itself 
have a definition of public. And that, 
basically, in the instructions -- they were 
added to the jury instructions. Those 
definitions of public came from other 
statutes, which it would appear from the 
language of those statutes that those 
definitions were only for that statute 
itself, or that portion of the statute -- for 
instance, the disorderly conduct statute, the 
pornography statute. 
I'd argue that the jury, itself, could have 
easily made a decision of simply what public 
means just because it's a very common term 
and didn't need any statutory instruction on 
that. And that's the basis of my objection, 
Your Honor. 
(R. 262 or addendum A). 
Defendant, then, wanted no instruction at all on the 
definition of "public place." He articulated the strategy 
1
 The rule makes an exception for cases involving "manifest 
injustice," which defendant has not asserted here. Utah R. Crim. 
P. 19(c). 
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underlying this position when he next objected to the lesser-
included-offense instruction: 
I object at this time to the inclusion of the 
lesser included offense. The State has filed 
an Information in this case and did not file 
it in the alternative, and the addition of 
the lesser included offense substantially 
prejudiced the defendant's case by the fact 
that we were looking forward to the -- going 
to the jury just on the first degree felony 
issuef with the inclusion of the enhancement, 
because of the fact that I do think that we 
have a very good issue with regards to 
whether or not that is a public park. 
Obviously, if the jury doesn't find it to be 
a public park, they could not find a first 
degree felony and the defendant would have 
been acquitted in that instance. And that's 
why we're objecting at this time. 
(R. 262-63)(emphasis added). Thus, defendant's two specific 
objections to the jury instructions were rooted in a single, 
clear strategy. He believed that if the jury had only the 
enhanced first degree felony to consider and could interpret 
"public park" in any way it chose, it would determine that Gazebo 
Park was not "public" and so acquit defendant. 
Defendant's strategy is further highlighted by his 
subsequent silence when the trial court, after explaining its 
rationale for giving jury instruction #28, raised the Perrine 
case sua sponte and mused over its definition of "public" within 
9 
a civil context (R. 266-67).2 The state then mentioned that the 
issue had been briefed at the preliminary hearing. In response, 
although defendant acknowledged that the state had done an 
''exhaustive search" of the law, he did not indicate even the 
slightest interest in a jury instruction based on Perrine's 
definition of "public" (R. 268).3 Defendant's last opportunity 
to raise the matter came at the end of the hearing when the court 
asked defendant if there was "any further matter of business" (R. 
269). Defendant replied that there was not. Throughout the 
hearing on objections to jury instructions, then, defendant 
remained consistent in his strategy that a jury instruction on 
the meaning of "public" should not be given. 
Given these undisputed facts, defendant's argument on appeal 
that the trial court should have given an instruction based on 
Perrine runs afoul of the invited error doctrine. "The doctrine 
2
 In Perrine. the Supreme Court construed the Landowner 
Liability Act, granting immunity under the Act only to those 
landowners who opened their property for recreational purposes to 
all members of the general public. It was in this civil context, 
with an articulated policy-driven result in mind, that the court 
interpreted the meaning of the term "public." See Perrine v. 
Kennecott Mining Corp., 911 P.2d 1290, 1293 (Utah 1996). 
3
 Nor, when defendant objected to jury instruction #28, did 
he offer a fall-back position of an instruction based on Perrine. 
10 
of invited error 'prohibits a party from setting up an error at 
trial and then complaining of it on appeal.'" State v. Perdue. 
813 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah App. 1991)(quoting State v. Henderson. 
792 P.2d 514, 516 (Wash. 1990)); accord State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 
1201, 1220 (Utah 1993). The purpose of the invited error 
doctrine is to discourage a defendant in a criminal case from 
inviting prejudicial error and then implanting it in the record 
"as a form of appellate insurance against an adverse sentence." 
State v. Parsons. 781 P.2d 1275, 1285 (Utah 1989); accord Dunn. 
850 P.2d at 1220 (noting the rule "discourages parties from 
intentionally misleading the trial court so as to preserve a 
hidden ground for reversal on appeal"). 
Because defendant asserted one position at trial -- that no 
instruction should have been given -- and then, when that 
strategy failed to produce the desired outcome, he asserted 
another contrary position on appeal, his claim should be 
rejected. "This inconsistency smacks of invited error, which is 
'procedurally unjustified and viewed with disfavor.'" Parsons v. 
BamSfi, 871 P.2d at 520 (quoting State vt Tillman# 750 P.2d 546, 
560-61 (Utah 1987)); flf. State v, PyllocK, 791 P.2d 155, 159 
(Utah 1989), cert, denied. 497 U.S. 1024 (1990)(defendants not 
entitled to both benefit of not objecting at trial and benefit of 
11 
objecting on appeal).4 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED 
THE JURY ON THE MEANING OF *PUBLIC 
PARK" AS THAT TERM IS USED IN THE 
ENHANCEMENT STATUTE 
To the extent that defendant's argument constitutes a 
challenge to the correctness of the instruction that was given, 
it must fail because the trial court accurately instructed the 
jury on the meaning of Mpublic" as that term is used in the drug 
4
 Similarly, defendant argues on appeal that the trial 
court committed plain error by submitting the enhanced charge, a 
first degree felony, to the jury (Br. of App. at 15-18). 
However, at trial, defendant explicitly stated that he wanted the 
criminal charge against him to be submitted to the jury as a 
first degree felony. Indeed, submission of the matter as a first 
degree felony constituted the very heart of his trial strategy. 
As defendant explained when he objected to the jury instructions 
defining "public place" and outlining a lesser-included offense: 
[W]e were looking forward to the -- going to 
the jury just on the first degree felony 
issue, with the inclusion of the enhancement, 
because of the fact that I do think that we 
have a very good issue with regards to 
whether or not that is a public park. 
Obviously, if the jury doesn't find it to be 
a public park, they could not find a first 
degree felony and the defendant would have 
been acquitted in that instance. 
(R. 263). 
Because defendant himself wanted the matter to be submitted 
to the jury as a first degree felony, he cannot now argue on 
appeal that the trial court erred by doing precisely as he 
wished. Dunn. 850 P.2d at 1220. 
12 
enhancement statute. Jury instruction #28 provided: 
Public place means any place to which the 
public or a substantial group of the public 
has access. 
A public place includes, but is not limited 
to streets, highways, and the common areas of 
schools, hospitals, apartment houses, office 
buildings, transport facilities, and shops. 
(R. 215). 
On appeal, this Court's inquiry centers on whether this 
instruction accurately stated the law. State v. Gallegos. 849 
P.2d 586, 590 (Utah App. 1993) . Accordingly, this Court gives no 
deference to the trial court's determination. State v. Deli. 861 
P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993). Once this Court determines that the 
instruction is accurate, however, its inquiry ends. Id. The 
precise content and specificity of jury instructions is left to 
the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Aly, 782 P.2d 
549, 550 (Utah App. 1989) (citations omitted). 
To determine whether the jury instruction accurately defined 
the term "public" as used in the drug enhancement statute, a 
reviewing court applies rules of statutory construction to the 
statute whose meaning is in question: 
"'The primary rule of statutory 
interpretation is to give effect to the 
intent of the legislature in light of the 
purpose the statute was meant to achieve.'" 
13 
Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co. of Utah, 853 
P.2d 877, 880 (Utah 1993)(quoting Reeves v. 
Gentile, 813 P.2d 111, 115 (Utah 1991)). 
Although we generally rely on the plain 
language rule of statutory construction, id. 
at 879, we note that an equally important 
rule of statutory construction is that a 
statute should be construed as a whole, with 
all of its provisions construed to be 
harmonious with each other and with the 
overall legislative objective of the statute 
(citations omitted). 
Nixon v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 898 P.2d 265, 268 (Utah 1995). 
The term "public" or the phrase "public park" as used in the 
Utah Controlled Substances Act is defined neither in the Act 
itself nor in any Utah case.5 The definition of "public place" 
found in Black's Law Dictionary, however, sheds light on the 
plain meaning of the phrase. In pertinent part, that definition 
provides that a public place 
is not necessarily a place devoted solely to 
the uses of the public, but a place which is 
in point of fact public rather than private, 
a place visited by many persons and usually 
5
 That the meaning of the term was not unambiguous from the 
plain language of the enhancement provision is evidenced by the 
dispute in this case: the state asked for one definition, the 
court conjectured about the application of another, and defendant 
at trial wanted neither. Under the circumstances, the trial 
court properly clarified the matter and provided guidance to the 
jury on the meaning of the term. See State v. Hamilton. 827 P.2d 
232, 238 (Utah 1992)(trial court has duty to instruct the jury on 
law applicable to facts). 
14 
accessible to the neighboring public (e.g. a 
park or public beach). Also, a place in 
which the public has an interest as affecting 
the safety, health, morals, and welfare of 
the community. 
Black's Law Dictionary 1107 (5th ed. 1979). The definition of 
"public place" in jury instruction #28 plainly comports with this 
definition. Both emphasize that the use is by "many persons" or 
"a substantial group of the public." Both seem to focus on a 
functional assessment of "publicness" -- that is, the Black's 
definition refers to "a place which is in point of fact public" 
and jury instruction #28 refers to "any place" to which there is 
access. 
Moreover, the intent of the legislature in originally 
enacting and later expanding the enhancement provision of the 
Controlled Substances Act supports the correctness of the 
definition adopted by the trial court.6 See State v. Scieszka. 
897 P.2d 1224, 1227 (Utah App. 1995)("[A] fundamental rule of 
statutory construction requires that a statute 'be looked at in 
its entirety and in accordance with the purpose which was sought 
to be accomplished.'")(citation omitted). The enhancement 
6
 Defendant has ignored both the legislative intent 
underlying the enhancement statute as well as its related public 
policy. When these two factors are taken into account, the 
inapplicability of Perrine becomes apparent. 
15 
provision of the Controlled Substances Act was enacted in 1986 
and subsequently amended in 1991 "to expand the number of 
locations where youth congregate to which the enhanced penalties 
will be applied." Statement of Sen. Lyle Hillyard on H.B. 176, 
49th Legislature, Feb. 27, 1991, Tape #47 (on file with the Utah 
House of Representatives). 
The public policy underlying the statutory purpose has been 
recognized by both of Utah's appellate courts. Penalties for 
distribution of drugs are enhanced when they occur within 1000 
feet of locations frequented by children in order to "'protect 
the public health, safety, and welfare of children of Utah from 
the presumed extreme potential danger created when drug 
transactions occur on or near a school ground [or other places 
frequented by children].'" State v. Powasnik. 918 P.2d 146, 149 
(Utah App. 1996)(quoting State v. Moore. 782 P.2d 497, 503 (Utah 
1989)). There can be no real dispute that the overarching intent 
of the enhancement statute is the creation of drug-free zones "to 
protect children from the influence of drug-related activity." 
State v. Strombercr. 783 P.2d 54, 60 (Utah App. 1989), cert. 
d£Hi£d, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). 
Given the unambiguous legislative intent and public policy 
underlying the enhancement provision, defendant's reliance on 
16 
Perrine v. Kennecott Mining Corp.. 911 P.2d 1290 (Utah 1996), 
simply makes no sense. In Perrine. the Utah Supreme Court 
focused on the legislature's intent in enacting the Landowner 
Liability Act, which was "*to encourage public and private owners 
of land to make land and water areas available to the public for 
recreational purposes by limiting their liability toward persons 
entering thereon for those purposes.'" Id. at 1292 (quoting Utah 
Code Ann. § 57-14-1). The legislature's explicit intent was 
central to the court's defining "public" as including all members 
of the general public. In the context of the enhancement 
statute, however, the Perrine definition would serve only to 
undercut both legislative intent and public policy. 
More appropriately, the state at trial, rather than 
resorting to an unrelated civil statute, proposed a definition of 
"public place" used in other analogous criminal provisions, 
specifically the disorderly conduct statute, Utah Code Ann. §76-
9-102(2)(same wording as instruction #28), and the prostitution 
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1301(3)(same as first sentence of 
instruction #28). 
The disorderly conduct provision prohibits conduct which 
"creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition" in a 
public place or "conduct intending to cause public inconvenience, 
17 
annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-102(1) (a)-(b) (1995). On its face, the 
statute is aimed at criminalizing certain conduct when it occurs 
in public places, presumably in order to protect members of the 
public from that conduct. Analogously, the enhancement 
provisions of section 58-37-8(5) are aimed at more severely 
penalizing those who commit drug-related crimes in locations 
frequented by children, also to protect the public and, in 
particular, its most vulnerable members, children. The trial 
court correctly noted these similarities when it evaluated the 
applicability of the disorderly conduct definition of "public 
place" to the enhancement statute (R. 264). 
The definition embodied in jury instruction #28 comports 
with both the intent of the legislature in enacting the 
enhancement statute and similar provisions elsewhere in the 
criminal code. In contrast, a narrower definition, such as the 
one now advocated by defendant, would exclude Gazebo Park, or any 
other park located within a planned residential urban 
development. In essence, the court would be choosing to insulate 
from increased liability those drug-dealers who were fortunate 
enough to live in or have access to parks in newer, upscale 
housing developments. Clearly, such a result would be untenable 
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and in direct conflict with both legislative intent and public 
policy- See State v. Martinez. 896 P.2d 38, 40 (Utah App. 
1995)(asserting statutory interpretations which render some part 
of a provision "nonsensical or absurd" are to be avoided) 
(quoting Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp.. 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 
1980)) . 
POINT THREE 
THE EVIDENCE THAT GAZEBO PARK WAS A 
PUBLIC PARK WAS SUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT 
Defendant argues that the evidence before the jury that 
Gazebo Park was a "public park" was insufficient to support his 
conviction for distribution of a controlled substance within 1000 
feet of a public park (Br. of App. at 11-14). The fatal flaw in 
defendant's argument is his mistaken reliance on the definition 
of "public" articulated in Perrine. When the evidence is 
properly viewed in the context of jury instruction #28, the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict is quite 
clear. 
An appellate court's role in reviewing the sufficiency of 
the evidence following a criminal conviction is a limited one. 
State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994). "Where there is 
any evidence, including reasonable inferences that can be drawn 
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from it, from which findings of all the elements of the crime can 
be made beyond a reasonable doubt, our inquiry is complete and we 
will sustain the verdict." State v. Gardner. 789 P.2d 273, 285 
(Utah 1989), cert, denied. 494 U.S. 1090 (1990). A conviction 
will be reversed on insufficiency grounds only when the evidence 
is so lacking that "reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt" that defendant committed the crime. State v. 
Petree. 659 P.2d 443# 444 (Utah 1983), superseded on other 
grounds. State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987). 
In the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the jury 
had before it the following evidence. Lake View Heights is a 
North Ogden subdivision of 366 homes in which ua large number of 
children" live (R. 283, 298-99). Conservatively, at least 1000 
people reside in Lake View Heights (R. 284). Gazebo Park, the 
largest of three parks within the confines of Lake View Heights, 
is outfitted with a small area of children's playground 
equipment, including swings, tires, and sand (R. 275, 287). 
Plainly, the presence of playground equipment in the park 
evidences an intent to attract children there to play. In 
addition, the park contains a gazebo with picnic tables, some 
grassy areas with trees, and tennis courts (R. 287). While signs 
at the park read: "Private Property. Lake View Heights Homeowner 
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Association, Members Only," the only area of controlled access in 
the park is the tennis courts (R. 276, 296) .7 Everyone who lives 
in Lake View Heights and, consequently, belongs to the Lake View 
Heights homeowners' association, has access to all park 
facilities (R. 297). Like any other park in Ogden, Gazebo Park 
is patrolled by the North Ogden city police department (R. 280). 
Without dispute, more than 1000 people, including many 
children, had access to Gazebo Park. A jury could thus 
reasonably infer that, despite the signage at this neighborhood 
recreation area, a ''substantial group of the public" -- all of 
the residents of Lake View Heights -- were welcome to use it.8 
Further, because "the common areas of . . . apartment houses 
[and] office buildings" are public places, the jury could also 
reasonably infer that the common recreation area of a subdivision 
is also a public place. £££ Jury instruction #28. Thus, 
7
 Moreover, the evidence was sufficient to establish that 
the park was open to the public, despite the posted sign, since 
"the park was accessible to and, in fact, used by many of the 
children in the neighborhood." See United States v. Horsley. 56 
F.3d 50, 52 (11th Cir. 1995) (addressing whether a playground 
that had posted signs indicating it was private was nonetheless 
"open to the public" under 21 U.S.C. § 860). 
8
 Certainly these individuals did not give up their status 
as members of the public simply by virtue of buying homes in this 
particular subdivision. 
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applying the facts before the jury to the law as articulated in 
jury instruction #28, the jury had sufficient evidence from which 
to conclude that Gazebo Park had sufficient indicia of being a 
"public park" to come within the ambit of the enhancement 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(5). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
first degree felony conviction for distribution of a controlled 
substance (cocaine) within 1000 feet of a public park. 
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ADDENDUM A 
(Objections to Jury Instructions) 
THE COURT: We agreed that we would 
make the objections on the record at this time, so go 
ahead, Mr* Boyle. 
MR. BOYLE: Your Honor, at this time 
I would object to the inclusion of the definitions of 
••public" in the jury instructions based on the fact 
that the statute itself, which includes the 
Controlled Substance Act, does not itself have a 
definition of public. And that, basically, in the 
instructions ~ they were added to the jury 
instructions. Those definitions of public came from 
other statutes, which it would appear from the 
language of those statutes that those definitions 
were only for that statute itself, or that portion of 
the statute — for instance, the disorderly conduct 
statute, the pornography statute. 
I'd argue that the jury, itself, could have 
easily made a decision of simply what public means 
just because it's a very common term and didn't need 
any statutory instruction on that. And that's the 
basis of my objection, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. BOYLE: Moreover, Your Honor, 
the — I object at this time to the inclusion of the 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
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lesser included offense. The State has filed an 
Information in this case and did not file it in the 
alternative, and the addition of the lesser included 
offense substantially prejudiced the defendant's case 
by the fact that we were looking forward to the — 
going to the jury just on the first degree felony 
issue, with the inclusion of the enhancement# because 
of the fact that I do think that we have a very good 
issue with regards to whether or not that is a public 
park. Obviously, if the jury doesn't find it to be a 
public parkf they could not find a first degree 
felony and the defendant would have been acquitted in 
that instance. And that's why we're objecting at 
this time. 
THE COURT: Okay. Any further 
objections? 
MR. BOYLE: Just one. For the 
record, Your Honor, if the Court could please state 
its reason for consistently overruling my objections 
with regards to hearsay when the officers were 
testifying to not only what the defendant might have 
said, but what the confidential informant had said, 
or possibly a female that was also talked about in 
the transcript. 
THE COURT: It's very easy. They 
1GT 
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are not being admitted for the truth of the matter 
asserted. In other words, their testimony of what 
the individual said, they were not trying to prove a 
fact or the truth of what the people were saying. 
They were just stating what they were hearing coming 
over the microphone. And that#s clearly not hearsay. 
MR. BOYLE: Okay. Thank you. 
THE COURT: The pleasure is almost 
all mine. Let's see, I — it occurred to me, Mr. 
Boyle, that this — the issue of the public park has 
kind of put you between a rock and a hard place. The 
Court has instructed the jury on what a public place 
is and has instructed them based on a provision out 
of the disorderly conduct section which is 76-9-102, 
subsection (2), and that section does specifically 
state that this definition applies to this section, 
which would imply that it's not a universal kind of 
definition. 
I instructed the jury in that regard, frankly, 
because I felt like the intent of the legislature in 
protecting the public would have been identical in 
the two sections, and I felt like that would be a 
good reason to do that. And I recognize because 
of — because of the position that your client finds 
himself in, wanting to have the issue submitted just 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 254 
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on the issue of the public park issue, it kind of 
puts you in a bad position to make a motion for a 
directed verdict on the issue of the public — 
whether it's a public park or not a public park under 
the provisions of the drug section — Title 58, isn't 
it? 
What I'm beating around the bush about is that 
you have not made a motion to — for a directed 
verdict, but in view of the circumstances of the case 
I'm not — I am not going to — I am going to allow 
you to consider a motion .for a judgment N.O.V. based 
on the concept of whether this is a public or private 
park. 
In other words, I'm not completely certain 
that I've instructed the jury correctly on that 
issue, so I suppose I'm reserving the prerogative of 
reconsidering or revisiting that issue, depending on 
what the jury verdict is. Thank you. 
MR. BOYLE: Thank you, Your Honor. 
I would assume that I would make that when you get 
the verdict back? 
THE COURT: Well, in order to make 
that motion, you see, you would had to have made a 
motion for a directed verdict, and, of course, you 
haven't done that -- and I think for certain 
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strategic reasons. I recognize the fact that that 
would have been a difficult philosophical position. 
But I'm not convinced — I/ve been looking at 
some of the other authorities. I just pulled up Utah 
Law On Disc and was looking at some cases, and the 
Supreme Court, in a fairly recent case — and this 
was sitting way back down in the deep, dark recesses 
of my mind. It was a civil case where somebody was 
injured in a public park. And the State had ~ one 
of the defenses that was raised was a provision where 
landowners, if they voluntarily allow people to use 
their property for recreational purposes, are not 
liable. It/s almost across the board. And the 
Supreme Court, in that case, spent a lot of time 
talking about what is — what is public land and what 
is private and ~ 
MR. BOYLE: That was the Kennecott 
case, wasn't it? 
THE COURT; Pardon me? 
MR. BOYLE: Was it the Kennecott 
case? 
THE COURT: No. It's — I don't 
remember. It came down maybe a month or two ago. 
It's fairly new law* 
But at any rate, they spent a lot of time 
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talking about the distinctions. They were using the 
distinction the other way in that case: Is this — 
is this private property? They seemed to feel that 
that would apply more to private property than it 
would to public, so they were talking about the 
distinction between public and private. And their 
definition of what was public property was a good 
deal broader than the definition we've used here. 
And the definition that they used is that there's a 
right of general access to public property, as 
opposed to ~ which would be almost — which would 
almost implicitly make this a private park as opposed 
to a public park. 
And I recognize that that's probably not a. 
good analogy because, in fact, it's, you know, an 
entirely different kind of lawsuit. It's civil, and 
we do have these criminal definitions that are a good 
deal more narrow, but it's something I think I would 
like to take a look at, depending on how the jury 
comes back. 
MR. SAUNDERS: That's fine, Your 
Honor. For the record, this is not new. Mr. Boyle 
and I briefed the issue before the Court on 
preliminary hearing and looked for applicable law. 
This was the closest thing we could find. 
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So effort has been made to try to find out if 
there is a definition that specifically applies to 
this type of case. There is not and those 
definitions that we've supplied to the Court are 
thosa we felt are the most appropriate. 
MR. BOYLE: Your Honor, the State's 
being modest. In fact, they did an exhaustive search 
to try to find out what public actually means. 
You looked all the way to New York, didn't 
you? Those two cases in New York? 
MR. SAUNDERS: The ones that said if 
a neighboring community has access? 
MR. BOYLE: Was that the New York 
cases? 
THE COURT: Well, it's certainly an 
interesting question. You know, it's a close 
question when you consider do we — you know, the 
common law was that you — that you interpret 
criminal statutes strictly, although our criminal 
code says, you know, that it's to be interpreted not 
as the common law strictly, but to best effectuate 
its purpose. And that's what I was kind of kicking 
around in my mind. Do we interpret it strictly, use 
a strict interpretation of what is public, or can we 
use a comparable statute? 
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Well, it's an interesting question. Maybe we 
won't have to worry about it. At any rate, any 
further matter of business? 
MR. BOYLE: That was it, Your Honor, 
THE COURT: All right. Court's in 
recess until the jury returns. 
(WHEREUPON, at this time objections to the 
jury instructions conclude.) 
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